Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination

被引：114

作者：

Khan, R

Dharwadkar, R

Brandes, P

机构：

[1] Syracuse Univ, Martin J Whitman Sch Management, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA

[2] SUNY Coll Technol Utica Rome, Inst Technol, Sch Management, Utica, NY 13504 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2005年 / 58卷 / 08期

关键词：

institutional ownership; executive compensation; corporate governance;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbusres.2004.02.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1078 / 1088

页数：11

共 39 条

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