Are people conditionally cooperative?: Evidence from a public goods experiment

被引:1582
作者
Fischbacher, U
Gächter, S
Fehr, E
机构
[1] Univ Zurich, Inst Empir Econ Res, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Univ St Gallen, FEW HSG, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland
关键词
voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation; free riding; strategy-method; experiments;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are conditional cooperators. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:397 / 404
页数:8
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