The incentive to discriminate by a vertically-integrated regulated firm: A reply

被引：24

作者：

Weisman, DL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kansas State Univ, Dept Econ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 14卷 / 01期

关键词：

Public Finance; Industrial Organization; Downstream Rival; Regulate Firm;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1008031906785

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

In Weisman (1995), I construct a model to investigate the incentives of a vertically-integrated regulated fin to discriminate against downstream rivals. This model suggests that the RBOCs do not have the same incentives to discriminate as AT&T prior to divestiture. Reiffen (1998) questions this and other conclusions. This reply addresses his claims.

引用

页码：87 / 91

页数：5

共 8 条

[1]

BEARD T, 1996, UNPUB REGULATION VER

[2]

ECONOMIDES N, 1997, INCENTIVE NONPRICE D

[3]

RIFFEN D, 1998, J REGULATORY EC, V14, P1

[4]

Sappington David E. M., 1996, Designing Incentive Regulation for the Telecommunications Industry

[5]

SIBLEY DE, 1998, IN PRESS INFORMATION

[6]

Sibley DS, 1998, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V17, P74, DOI 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199824)17:1<74::AID-PAM5>3.0.CO

[7]

2-E

[8]

REGULATION AND THE VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRM - THE CASE OF RBOC ENTRY INTO INTERLATA LONG-DISTANCE [J].

WEISMAN, DL .

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 1995, 8 (03) :249-266

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