Transfer prices for multienterprise supply chain optimization

被引:73
作者
Gjerdrum, J
Shah, N [1 ]
Papageorgiou, LG
机构
[1] Univ London Imperial Coll Sci Technol & Med, Ctr Proc Syst Engn, London SW7 2BY, England
[2] UCL, Dept Chem Engn, London WC1E 7JE, England
关键词
D O I
10.1021/ie000668m
中图分类号
TQ [化学工业];
学科分类号
0817 ;
摘要
A key issue in supply chain optimization involving multiple enterprises is the determination of policies that optimize the performance of the supply chain as a whole while ensuring adequate rewards for each participant. In this work, a mathematical programming formulation is presented for fair, optimized profit distribution between members of multienterprise supply chains. The proposed formulation is based on a novel approach applying game theoretical Nash-type models to find the optimal profit level for each enterprise subject to given minimum profit requirements. A modeling framework for distributed profit optimization for an n-enterprise supply chain network is first presented. The supply chain planning problem is then formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model including a nonlinear Nash-type objective function. Model decision variables include intercompany transfer prices, production and inventory levels, resource utilization, and flows of products between echelons, subject to a deterministic sales profile, minimum profit requirements for each enterprise. and various resource constraints. A separable programming approach is finally applied utilizing logarithmic differentiation and approximations of the variables of the objective function. The resulting model is of the mixed-integer linear programming form. The applicability of the approach is demonstrated through case studies based on industrial processes relevant to process systems engineering.
引用
收藏
页码:1650 / 1660
页数:11
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