Implementation and renegotiation

被引：117

作者：

Maskin, E ^{[1
]}

Moore, J

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England

[3] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1999年 / 66卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-937X.00077

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

引用

页码：39 / 56

页数：18

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