Politicians and banks:: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets

被引:601
作者
Dinç, IS [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
corporate governance; political economy; corruption; state-owned enterprises; electoral cycle;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's total loan portfolio or about 0.5% of the median country's GDP per election per government-owned bank. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:453 / 479
页数:27
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