Strategizing in the brain

被引：125

作者：

Camerer, CF ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci 228 77, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

SCIENCE | 2003年 / 300卷 / 5626期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1126/science.1086215

中图分类号：

O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1673 / 1675

页数：3

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