Patent buyouts: A mechanism for encouraging innovation

被引:185
作者
Kremer, M [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会; 美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/003355398555865
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions' social and private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.
引用
收藏
页码:1137 / 1167
页数:31
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