Conditional reasoning with inducements and advice

被引:41
作者
Evans, JST [1 ]
Twyman-Musgrove, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Plymouth, Dept Psychol, Ctr Thinking & Language, Plymouth PL4 8AA, Devon, England
关键词
deductive reasoning; conditionals;
D O I
10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00062-6
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In an earlier study of conditional reasoning, Newstead et al. [Newstead, S.E., Ellis, C.E., Evans, J.St.B.T., Dennis, I., (1997). Conditional reasoning with realistic material. Thinking and Reasoning 3, 49-96] found that people drew more inferences from conditionals framed as inducements (threats and promises) than from conditionals phrased as advice (tips and warnings). The present study was designed to test. the hypothesis that this difference arose from the fact that the speaker of an inducement is normally seen to have control over the consequent event whereas the giver of advice does not. In the experiment reported here, inducement and advice conditionals were constructed in brief contexts such that in either case the speaker could be seen to have high or low control. Participants drew many more conditional inferences of all kinds for high control than for low control conditionals in either context. A second finding of interest was that participants drew many more forward (antecedent to consequent) inferences than backward inferences with these kinds of realistic conditionals. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:B11 / B16
页数:6
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