Rent-seeking and innovation

被引:62
作者
Boldrin, M
Levine, DK [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Dept Econ, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
intellectual property; patent; trade secrecy; rent seeking; innovation;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.07.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-off between private and public rent-seeking. While it is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement. When the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and private rent-seeking together. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 160
页数:34
相关论文
共 20 条
  • [1] ANTON J, 2000, LITTLE PATENTS BIG S
  • [2] ANTON JJ, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P190
  • [3] BATTACHARYA S, 1983, REV ECON STUD, V50, P331
  • [4] Becker G.S., 1971, Economic Theory
  • [5] BESSEN J, 2000, 0001 MIT DEP EC
  • [6] The case against intellectual property
    Boldrin, M
    Levine, D
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2002, 92 (02) : 209 - 212
  • [7] BOLDRIN M, 1997, GROWTH PERFECT COMPE
  • [8] BOLDRIN M, 1999, PERFECTLY COMPETITIV
  • [9] COHEN WM, 2002, PATENTS THEIR EFFECT
  • [10] PATENTS AS INFORMATION-TRANSFER MECHANISMS - TO PATENT OR (MAYBE) NOT TO PATENT
    HORSTMANN, I
    MACDONALD, GM
    SLIVINSKI, A
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1985, 93 (05) : 837 - 858