A new solution to the random assignment problem

被引：411

作者：

Bogomolnaia, A ^{[1
]}

Moulin, H ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] So Methodist Univ, Dept Econ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2001年 / 100卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

random assignment; ordinal; ex post or ex ante efficiency; strategyproofness; envy-free;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2000.2710

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

引用

页码：295 / 328

页数：34

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