Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks

被引:654
作者
Buchak, Greg [1 ]
Matvos, Gregor [2 ]
Piskorski, Tomasz [3 ]
Seru, Amit [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA
[3] Columbia Grad Sch Business, New York, NY USA
[4] Stanford GSB, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[5] Hoover Inst War Revolut & Peace, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Fintech; Shadow banks; Regulatory arbitrage; Lending; Mortgages; FHA; MORTGAGE MODIFICATION; MODELS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.011
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007 to 2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online "fintech" lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Relative to other shadow banks, fintech lenders serve more creditworthy borrowers and are more active in the refinancing market. Fintech lenders charge a premium of 14-16 basis points and appear to provide convenience rather than cost savings to borrowers. They seem to use different information to set interest rates relative to other lenders. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:453 / 483
页数:31
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