Does civil law tradition and universal banking crowd out securities markets? Pre-World War I Germany as counter-example

被引：19

作者：

Fohlin, Caroline

机构：

[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

[2] Johns Hopkins Univ, Inst Appl Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Study Business Enterprise, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

来源：

ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY | 2007年 / 8卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1093/es/khm068

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article poses three main questions: Does the civil-law tradition favor large, concentrated, universal banking systems? Does this sort of legal system work against the development of active securities markets? Do powerful universal banks (whether or not legal tradition lies at the root of bank power) replace securities markets or prevent them from operating efficiently? Based on evidence from Pre-World War I Germany, this paper argues that the answer to all three questions is "no."

引用

页码：602 / 641

页数：40