Solving three-player games by the matrix approach with application to an electric power market

被引:33
作者
Lee, KH [1 ]
Baldick, R
机构
[1] Dankook Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Seoul 140714, South Korea
[2] Univ Texas, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Austin, TX 78712 USA
关键词
bimatrix game; complementarity problem; deregulation; dominated strategy; electric power market; game theory; mixed strategy; Nash equilibrium; payoff matrix;
D O I
10.1109/TPWRS.2003.818744
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium (NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multiplayer games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multiplayer game. The formulation of the NE condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method. The proposed method outperforms a publicly available game theory software for the application problems.
引用
收藏
页码:1573 / 1580
页数:8
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