A market-power based model of business groups

被引:15
作者
Feenstra, RC
Huang, DS
Hamilton, GG
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei, Taiwan
[4] Univ Washington, Dept Sociol, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
关键词
business group; chaebol; vertical integration; horizontal integration;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00181-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose an model of vertically and horizontally-integrated business groups that allows the number and size of each group to be determined endogenously. We find that more than one configuration of groups can arise in equilibrium: several different types of business groups can occur, each of which are consistent with profit-maximization and are stable. We suggest that the strongly-integrated groups arising in the model characterize the chaebol found in South Korea, whereas the less-integrated groups describe those found in Taiwan. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:459 / 485
页数:27
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