The partisan basis of procedural choice: Allocating parliamentary rights in the house, 1789-1990

被引:65
作者
Binder, SA
机构
[1] Res. Assoc. in Governmental Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2082794
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Conventional accounts of the institutional development of Congress suggest that expansion of the size and workload of the House led members to distribute parliamentary rights narrowly: Majority party leaders accrued strong procedural powers while minority parties lost many of their parliamentary rights. I offer an alternative, partisan basis of procedural choice. Using an original data set of changes in House rules, I present a statistical model to assess the influence of partisan and nonpartisan factors on changes in minority procedural rights in the House between 1789 and 1990. I find that short-term partisan goals-constrained by inherited rules-shape both the creation and suppression of rights for partisan and political minorities. Collective institutional concerns and longer-term calculations about future parliamentary needs have little impact on changes in minority rights. The findings have important theoretical implications for explaining both the development of Congress and the nature of institutional change more generally.
引用
收藏
页码:8 / 20
页数:13
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