Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents

被引:25
作者
Ghatak, Maitreesh [1 ,2 ]
Mueller, Hannes [3 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[2] London Sch Econ, STICERD, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Bellaterra 08193, Barcelona, Spain
关键词
Not-for-profits; Intrinsic motivation; Labor donation; Free-riding; NONPROFIT; SECTOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:94 / 105
页数:12
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