Hedge funds often impose lockups and notice periods to limit the ability of investors to withdraw capital. We model the investor's decision to withdraw capital as a real option and treat lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. Our methodology incorporates time-varying probabilities of hedge fund failure and optimal early exercise. We estimate a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 1% of the initial investment for an investor with constant relative risk aversion utility and risk aversion of three. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 10% if the hedge fund manager can arbitrarily suspend withdrawals.
机构:
Santa Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
Chacko, George C.
;
Jurek, Jakub W.
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机构:
Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
Jurek, Jakub W.
;
Stafford, Erik
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机构:
Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
机构:
Santa Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
Chacko, George C.
;
Jurek, Jakub W.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA
Jurek, Jakub W.
;
Stafford, Erik
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USASanta Clara Univ, 6S Capital AG, Santa Clara, CA 95053 USA