A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

被引:22
作者
Chung, Rae Kwon
机构
关键词
CDM; CERs; non-Annex 1 country commitments; post-2012; negotiations; political decision making;
D O I
10.1080/14693062.2007.9685647
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change. Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.
引用
收藏
页码:171 / 176
页数:6
相关论文
共 9 条
[1]  
Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. The Convention em
[2]  
Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States (http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/ items/2704.php)
[3]  
Discounting of CERs is different from banking of CERs for future commitment, as this idea proposes to retire the unsold CERs completely from the carbon market. The CDM Executive Board could issue only a certain proportion of the total CERs at the time of the issuance of CERs even before it reaches the hands of project developers
[4]  
This does not mean that only CERs from unilateral CDM should be discounted. Discounting should be done for all CERs whether they are from bilateral or unilateral CDM. Discounting of CERs from unilateral CDM is a direct emission reduction made by non-Annex I countries. However, discounting of CERs from bilateral CDM could also be a reduction made in non-Annex 1, generated from the projects invested from Annex 1
[5]  
There are different interpretations of the meaning of 'unilateral'. One interpretation is: 'non-Annex I initiating a CDM project and banking the CERs for its future commitment
[6]  
thus selling the CERs to Annex I is not unilateral'. Another is: 'completing a CDM project by the non-Annex I without any involvement of Annex I until CERs is generated
[7]  
thus a CDM project based on a CER purchasing agreement is not unilateral'. The definition of 'unilateral' in this article is 'a CDM project whose ownership and project risk belongs to non-Annex I entities for the purpose of selling the CERs to Annex I buyers'
[8]  
There are three additionality criteria for CDM: project additionality, technical additionality and financial additionality. The author believes that the technical and financial additionality aspects should be maintained, but not project additionality
[9]  
www.china.org.cn/english/features/guideline/156529.htm, See