Perpetual Versus Subscription Licensing Under Quality Uncertainty and Network Externality Effects

被引:83
作者
Zhang, Jie [1 ]
Seidmann, Abraham [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Arlington, Coll Business Adm, Arlington, TX 76019 USA
[2] Univ Rochester, William E Simon Grad Sch Business, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
compatibility; network externality; price discrimination; quality uncertainty; software licensing; upgrades; DURABLE-GOODS; MONOPOLY; UPGRADES; SOFTWARE;
D O I
10.2753/MIS0742-1222270103
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
We discuss the optimal way for a software vendor to license software: a perpetual license at a posted price, a subscription contract that subscribers receive automatic updates for periodic payment, or a hybrid approach that involves both. By addressing specific issues in the software market such as network effects, quality uncertainty, upgrade compatibility, and the vendor's ability to commit to future prices in a dynamic environment, we demonstrate how a software vendor can manage the trade-offs of perpetual licensing and subscription to optimize profit, as well as the corresponding welfare effect on consumers. Although the subscription model helps the vendor lock in consumers so as to increase profit when there is great uncertainty associated with the next version software, it destroys the path dependence in creating network externalities. Therefore, when the network effect is sufficiently large, it is more profitable for a software vendor to provide both perpetual licensing and subscription.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 68
页数:30
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