Tradable permit allocations and sequential choice

被引:10
作者
MacKenzie, Ian A. [1 ]
机构
[1] ETH, Ctr Econ Res, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Initial allocation; International tradable permit market; Stackelberg; ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE;
D O I
10.1016/j.reseneeco.2010.06.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates initial allocation choices in an international tradable pollution permit market. For two sovereign governments, we compare allocation choices that are either simultaneously or sequentially announced. We show sequential allocation announcements result in higher (lower) aggregate emissions when announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). Whether allocation announcements are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the relationship between the follower's damage function and governments' abatement costs. When the marginal damage function is relatively steep (flat), allocation announcements are strategic substitutes (complements). For quadratic abatement costs and damages, sequential announcements provide a higher level of aggregate emissions. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:268 / 278
页数:11
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