Finite order implications of common priors

被引:22
作者
Lipman, BL
机构
[1] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
关键词
common prior assumption; universal belief space; common knowledge; common belief;
D O I
10.1111/1468-0262.00446
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
I characterize the implications of the common prior assumption for finite orders of beliefs about beliefs at a state and show that in finite models, the only such implications are those stemming from the weaker assumption of a common support. More precisely, given any finite N and any finite partitions model where priors have the same support, there is another finite partitions model with common priors that has the same nth order beliefs and knowledge for all n less than or equal to N.
引用
收藏
页码:1255 / 1267
页数:13
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