Team approaches in reducing nonpoint source pollution

被引:28
作者
Romstad, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Agr Univ Norway, Dept Econ & Resource Management, N-1432 As, Norway
关键词
nonpoint source pollution; game theory; environmental economics; incentives; enforcement and monitoring;
D O I
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2002.10.002
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
It is technically difficult and costly to monitor nonpoint source pollution. Consequently, most economic instruments directed towards reducing this type of pollution have focused on circumventing the monitoring problem by focusing on readily observable factors. Such instruments include taxes or tradable pen-nits on inputs or other incentives to induce changes in fanning practices. One difficulty with such approaches is that the incentives may not be consistent with the primary objectives of the policies-to reduce nutrient runoffs. This paper seeks to identify under what conditions it would be beneficial to apply more direct incentives for reduced nutrient runoffs. Monitoring and enforcement are core issues in this connection. It is still difficult to monitor individual farm field runoffs. Hence, the incentive problems associated with multiple agents emitting to the same recipient need to be resolved. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:71 / 78
页数:8
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