Equilibrium asset pricing with systemic risk

被引:36
作者
Danielsson, Jon [1 ,2 ]
Zigrand, Jean-Pierre [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[2] FMG, London WC2A 2AE, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
systemic risk; value-at-risk; risk sensitive regulation; general equilibrium;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-007-0238-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide an equilibrium multi-asset pricing model with micro- founded systemic risk and heterogeneous investors. Systemic risk arises due to excessive leverage and risk taking induced by free-riding externalities. Global risk-sensitive financial regulations are introduced with a view of tackling systemic risk, with Value-at-Risk a key component. The model suggests that risk-sensitive regulation can lower systemic risk in equilibrium, at the expense of poor risk-sharing, an increase in risk premia, higher and asymmetric asset volatility, lower liquidity, more comovement in prices, and the chance that markets may not clear.
引用
收藏
页码:293 / 319
页数:27
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