Evolutionary dynamics of biological games

被引:831
作者
Nowak, MA
Sigmund, K
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Dept Math, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Vienna, Fac Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
[3] Int Inst Appl Syst Anal, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
关键词
D O I
10.1126/science.1093411
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Darwinian dynamics based on mutation and selection form the core of mathematical models for adaptation and coevolution of biological populations. The evolutionary outcome is often not a fitness-maximizing equilibrium but can include oscillations and chaos. For studying frequency-dependent selection, game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms. Replicator and adaptive dynamics describe short- and long-term evolution in phenotype space and have found applications ranging from animal behavior and ecology to speciation, macroevolution, and human language. Evolutionary game theory is an essential component of a mathematical and computational approach to biology.
引用
收藏
页码:793 / 799
页数:7
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