Foreign direct investment, intra-firm trade and ownership structure

被引:28
作者
Konrad, KA
Lommerud, KE
机构
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Dept Econ, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
[2] Univ Bergen, Dept Econ, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
关键词
foreign investment; intra-firm trade; hold-up problem;
D O I
10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00015-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. Selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational's information rent that is protected from a host government's confiscatory taxation, (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:475 / 494
页数:20
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