Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization

被引:96
作者
Eusepi, Stefano [1 ]
Preston, Bruce [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[3] Australian Natl Univ, Ctr Appl Macroecon Anal, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
MONETARY-POLICY RULES; SOCIAL VALUE; TRANSPARENCY; STABILITY; CONVERGENCE; CREDIBILITY; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; DETERMINACY; INFLATION;
D O I
10.1257/mac.2.3.235
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The value of communication is analyzed in a model in which agents' expectations need not be consistent with central bank policy. Without communication, the Taylor principle is not sufficient for macroeconomic stability: divergent learning dynamics are possible. Three communication strategies are contemplated to ensure consistency between private forecasts and monetary policy strategy: communicating the precise details of policy; communicating only the variables on which policy decisions are conditioned; and communicating the inflation target. The former strategies restore the Taylor principle as a sufficient condition for anchoring expectations. The latter strategy, in general, fails to protect against expectations-driven fluctuations. (JEL E32, E43, E52, E58)
引用
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页码:235 / 271
页数:37
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