The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment

被引:124
作者
Abbring, JH [1 ]
van den Berg, GJ [1 ]
van Ours, JC [1 ]
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01011.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Sanctions or punitive benefits reductions are increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements. This article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. After correction for selectivity in the imposition of sanctions, we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re-employment rates.
引用
收藏
页码:602 / 630
页数:29
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