Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs with incomplete information

This paper describes a method for analyzing the competition among transmission-constrained Generating Companies (GENCOs) with incomplete information. Each GENCO models its opponents' unknown information with specific types for transforming the incomplete game into a complete game with imperfect information. The proposed methodology employs the supply function equilibrium for modeling a GENCO's bidding strategy. The competition is modeled as a bilevel problem with the upper subproblem representing individual GENCOs and the lower subproblem representing the Independent System Operator (ISO). The upper subproblem maximizes the individual GENCOs' payoffs and the lower subproblem solves the ISO's market clearing problem for minimizing consumers' payments. The bilevel problem is solved by developing sensitivity functions for a GENCO's payoff with respect to its bidding strategies. An eight-bus system is employed to illustrate the proposed method, and the numerical results show the impact of transfer capability on GENCOs' bidding strategies.