Informational regulation of environmental risks

被引:60
作者
Kleindorfer, PR [1 ]
Orts, EW [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
informational regulation; environmental risk management; transactions costs; performance based; specification-based regulation; private rights;
D O I
10.1111/j.1539-6924.1998.tb00927.x
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third-party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law.
引用
收藏
页码:155 / 170
页数:16
相关论文
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