Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies

被引：36

作者：

Cox, JC ^{[1
]}

Walker, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1998年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

experiments; learning; duopoly;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00060-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper reports results from experiments designed to determine whether subjects can learn to play Cournot duopoly strategies and whether their out-of-equilibrium play is consistent with the predictions of learning models. The experiments include duopolies with constant and with decreasing marginal costs, and with theoretically stable and unstable equilibria. After a few periods, subjects do play stable interior equilibria but they do not play stable boundary equilibria nor unstable interior equilibria. Subjects' out-of-equilibrium play is inconsistent with the predictions of the learning models. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：141 / 161

页数：21