Rational preferences under ambiguity

被引:60
作者
Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone [3 ,4 ]
Ghirardato, Paolo [1 ,2 ]
Maccheroni, Fabio [3 ,4 ]
Marinacci, Massimo [3 ,4 ]
Siniscalchi, Marciano [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Turin, DSMA, Turin, Italy
[2] Univ Turin, Coll Carlo Alberto, Turin, Italy
[3] Univ Bocconi, Dept Decis Sci, Milan, Italy
[4] Univ Bocconi, IGIER, Milan, Italy
[5] Northwestern Univ, Chicago, IL 60611 USA
关键词
Rational preferences; Ambiguity; Unambiguous acts and events; MAXMIN EXPECTED UTILITY; SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES; BELIEFS; DEFINITION; SEPARATION; AVERSION; EVENTS; MODEL; RISK;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-011-0643-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes preferences in the presence of ambiguity that are rational in the sense of satisfying the classical ordering condition as well as monotonicity. Under technical conditions that are natural in an Anscombe-Aumann environment, we show that even for such a general preference model, it is possible to identify a set of priors, as first envisioned by Ellsberg (Q J Econ 75:643-669, 1961). We then discuss ambiguity attitudes, as well as unambiguous acts and events, for the class of rational preferences we consider.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 375
页数:35
相关论文
共 35 条