A rule is not a rule if it changes from case to case (a reply to Marshall's comment)

被引:14
作者
van Veelen, Matthijs [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Hamilton's rule; Queller's rule; Inclusive fitness; Group selection; Generalized equal gains from switching; KIN SELECTION; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.11.011
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
This is a reply to "Queller's rule ok: Comment on van Veelen 'when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong'" by James Marshall in the Journal of Theoretical Biology, in this issue. In order to circumvent the disagreement about the Price equation and focus on the issue of the predictive power of inclusive fitness for group selection models, I derive Queller's and Marshall's rule without the Price equation. Both rules however need a translation step in order to be able to link them to the group selection model in van Veelen (2009). Queller's rule applies to games with 2 players and 2 strategies, and is general. Marshall's rule on the other hand applies only to a small subset of 3-player games. His rule is correct, but for other, similarly small subsets we would get other rules. This implies that if we want a rule that applies to all symmetric games with 3 players and 2 strategies, it will have to use a vector of dimension 2 that represents population structure. More in general: for group selection models with groups of size n, a correct and general prediction will need to use a vector of dimension n 1 that represents population structure. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 195
页数:7
相关论文
共 16 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1998, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES P
[2]  
Grafen A., 1985, Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, V2, P28
[3]   Detecting kin selection at work using inclusive fitness [J].
Grafen, Alan .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 2007, 274 (1610) :713-719
[4]  
HAMILTON WD, 1964, J THEOR BIOL, V7, P1, DOI [10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4, 10.1016/0022-5193(64)90039-6]
[5]   Evolution in group-structured populations can resolve the tragedy of the commons [J].
Killingback, Timothy ;
Bieri, Jonas ;
Flatt, Thomas .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 2006, 273 (1593) :1477-1481
[6]   Group selection and kin selection: Two concepts but one process [J].
Lehmann, Laurent ;
Keller, Laurent ;
West, Stuart ;
Roze, Denis .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2007, 104 (16) :6736-6739
[7]   The evolution of eusociality [J].
Nowak, Martin A. ;
Tarnita, Corina E. ;
Wilson, Edward O. .
NATURE, 2010, 466 (7310) :1057-1062
[8]   QUANTITATIVE GENETICS, INCLUSIVE FITNESS, AND GROUP SELECTION [J].
QUELLER, DC .
AMERICAN NATURALIST, 1992, 139 (03) :540-558
[9]   KINSHIP, RECIPROCITY AND SYNERGISM IN THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL-BEHAVIOR [J].
QUELLER, DC .
NATURE, 1985, 318 (6044) :366-367
[10]   067UD Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection [J].
Traulsen, Arne ;
Nowak, Martin A. .
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2006, 103 (29) :10952-10955