Rational nonprofit entrepreneurship

被引：9

作者：

Bilodeau, M ^{[1
]}

Slivinski, A

机构：

[1] Indiana Univ Purdue Univ, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA

[2] Univ Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, PQ J1K 2R1, Canada

[3] Univ Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5C2, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1998年 / 7卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/105864098567515

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.

引用

页码：551 / 571

页数：21

共 25 条

[1] GIVING WITH IMPURE ALTRUISM - APPLICATIONS TO CHARITY AND RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE [J].