Measuring inequity aversion in a heterogeneous population using experimental decisions and subjective probabilities

被引:165
作者
Bellemare, Charles [1 ,2 ]
Kroeger, Sabine [1 ,2 ]
Van Soest, Arthur [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada
[2] Ctr Interuniv Risque Polit Econ & Emploi, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada
[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr & Operat Res & Netspar, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
ultimatum game; inequity aversion; subjective expectations;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00860.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We combine choice data in the ultimatum game with the expectations of proposers elicited by subjective probability questions to estimate a structural model of decision making under uncertainty. The model, estimated using a large representative sample of subjects from the Dutch population, allows both nonlinear preferences for equity and expectations to vary across socioeconomic groups. Our results indicate that inequity aversion to one's own disadvantage is an increasing and concave function of the payoff difference. We also find considerable heterogeneity in the population. Young and highly educated subjects have lower aversion for inequity than other groups. Moreover, the model that uses subjective data on expectations generates much better in- and out-ofsample predictions than a model which assumes that players have rational expectations.
引用
收藏
页码:815 / 839
页数:25
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]   What do bargainers' preferences look like? Experiments with a convex ultimatum game [J].
Andreoni, J ;
Castillo, M ;
Petrie, R .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2003, 93 (03) :672-685
[2]   Giving according to garp: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism [J].
Andreoni, J ;
Miller, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 2002, 70 (02) :737-753
[3]   Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism [J].
Andreoni, J ;
Vesterlund, L .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 116 (01) :293-312
[4]  
[Anonymous], J BUSINESS, DOI DOI 10.1086/296365
[5]   Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases [J].
Babcock, L ;
Loewenstein, G .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1997, 11 (01) :109-126
[6]   Confusion or fairness in the field? Rejections in the ultimatum game under the strategy method [J].
Bahry, DL ;
Wilson, RK .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2006, 60 (01) :37-54
[7]  
BELLEMARE C, 2008, EC SUPPLEMENTAL MAT, V76
[8]   On representative social capital [J].
Bellemare, Charles ;
Kroger, Sabine .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 51 (01) :183-202
[9]   ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition [J].
Bolton, GE ;
Ockenfels, A .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (01) :166-193
[10]   AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST FOR GENDER DIFFERENCES IN BENEFICENT BEHAVIOR [J].
BOLTON, GE ;
KATOK, E .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1995, 48 (3-4) :287-292