Politicians on the board of directors: Do connections affect the bottom line?

被引:613
作者
Hillman, AJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, Dept Management, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
boards of directors; politicians; board composition;
D O I
10.1177/0149206304272187
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Resource dependence theory emphasizes the importance of linking firms with external contingencies that create uncertainty and interdependence. A critical source of external interdependency and uncertainty for business is government. One way to link a firm to the government is appointing ex-politicians to the board of directors. This study compares the boards of two groups of firms those from heavily and less regulated industries-and finds the former group has more politician directors. Firms with politicians on the board are associated with better market-based performance across both groups, although the relationship is more pronounced within heavily regulated industries.
引用
收藏
页码:464 / 481
页数:18
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