Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality

被引:82
作者
de Paula, Aureo [1 ]
Scheinkman, Jose A. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
DETERMINANTS; SECTOR; SIZE;
D O I
10.1257/mac.2.4.195
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present an equilibrium model of tax avoidance and test its implications using a survey of firms in Brazil. In the model, the credit method used to collect value-added tax (VAT) creates informality chains-clients or suppliers of informal firms are more likely to be informal. An increase in enforcement in a production stage increases formality downstream and upstream. Various empirical measures of formality of suppliers and buyers, and of enforcement downstream and upstream, are positively correlated with formality. When the VAT is applied in a single stage of production at a rate estimated by the authorities, these chain effects disappear. (JEL H25, H26, L14, L21, O14, O17)
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 221
页数:27
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