Disclosure by Politicians

被引:91
作者
Djankov, Simeon [1 ]
La Porta, Rafael [2 ]
Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio [3 ]
Shleifer, Andrei [4 ]
机构
[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Tuck Sch, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[3] EDHEC Business Sch, F-06202 Nice 3, France
[4] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
FIELD EXPERIMENT; CORRUPTION; ACCOUNTABILITY; GOVERNMENT; PRIVACY; ECONOMICS; QUALITY; MEDIA;
D O I
10.1257/app.2.2.179
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by members of Parliament in 175 countries. Although two-thirds of tie countries have some disclosure laws, less than one-third make disclosures available to the public, and less than one-sixth of potentially useful information is publicly available in practice, on average. Countries that are richer, more democratic, and have free press have more disclosure. Public disclosure, but not internal disclosure to parliament, is positively related to government quality, including lower corruption. (JEL J13, I21, I12)
引用
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页码:179 / 209
页数:31
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