Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

被引:67
作者
Wang, Zhen [1 ]
Du, Wen-Bo [2 ,3 ]
Cao, Xian-Bin [2 ]
Zhang, Lian-Zhong [1 ]
机构
[1] Nankai Univ, Sch Phys, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China
[2] Beihang Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Comp Sci & Technol, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Prisoner's dilemma game; Cooperation; Fitness; Environment; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; RESONANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2010.12.003
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Outwork may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1234 / 1239
页数:6
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