Three-person spanning tree games

被引：3

作者：

Alidaee, B ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mississippi, Sch Business, Management & Mkt Dept, University, MS 38677 USA

来源：

MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING | 1999年 / 29卷 / 01期

关键词：

cooperative games in characteristic form; spanning tree games; core; r-value; nucleolus; shapley value;

D O I：

10.1016/S0895-7177(98)00181-2

中图分类号：

TP39 [计算机的应用];

学科分类号：

081203 [计算机应用技术]; 0835 [软件工程];

摘要：

There are many situations where allocation of costs among the users of a minimum spanning tree network is a problem of concern. In [1], formulation of this problem as a game theoretic model, spanning tree games, has been considered. It is well known that st games have nonempty cores. Many researchers have studied other solutions related to st games. In this paper, we study three-person st games. Various properties connected to the convexity or no-convexity, and T-value is studied. A characterization of the core and geometric interpretation is given. In special cases, the nucleolus of the game is given. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：107 / 123

页数：17

共 14 条

[1]

Aarts H., 1993, ZOR, Methods and Models of Operations Research, V38, P163, DOI 10.1007/BF01414212

[2]

Alidaee B., 1994, ZOR, Methods and Models of Operations Research, V39, P243, DOI 10.1007/BF01415584

[3]

COST ALLOCATION FOR A SPANNING TREE - GAME THEORETIC APPROACH [J].