Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard

被引:129
作者
Brandt, H
Sigmund, K
机构
[1] Univ Vienna, Fak Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
[2] Int Inst Appl Syst Anal, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
关键词
cooperation; reputation; evolutionary dynamics;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.0407370102
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Whether one-shot interactions can stably sustain mutual cooperation if they are based on a minimal form of reputation building has been the subject of considerable debate. We show by mathematical modeling that the answer is positive if we assume an individual's social network evolves in time. In this case, a stable mixture of discriminating and undiscriminating altruists can be proof against invasion by defectors. This sheds light on current discussions about the merits of different types of moral assessment, an issue where theoretical arguments and experimental findings seem at odds. Unexpectedly, our approach also relates to the proverbial observation that people tend to become more tightfisted with age.
引用
收藏
页码:2666 / 2670
页数:5
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