The concavity axiom in bilateral monopoly

被引:2
作者
Pita, C [1 ]
Torregrosa, RJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Salamanca, Fac Econ & Empresa, E-37008 Salamanca, Spain
关键词
Nash bargaining solution; uncertainty; bilateral monopoly;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00079-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The Nash solution has been systematically applied to solve most wage bargaining models. We show that this solution should not be used in a bilateral monopoly model in which wage bargaining takes place under uncertainty over the future state of nature due to the nonfulfillment of the-often neglected-concavity axiom. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:211 / 217
页数:7
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