Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings?

被引：289

作者：

Shivakumar, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 29卷 / 03期

关键词：

corporate finance; accruals; earnings management; seasoned equity offerings; offering announcements;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00026-4

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

I examine earnings management around seasoned equity offerings and, consistent with Rangan (J. Financial Econ. 50 (1998) 101) and Teoh et al. (J. Financial Econ. 50(1998) 63), find evidence of earnings management around the offerings. However, in contrast to their conclusions, I show that investors infer earnings management and rationally undo its effects at equity offering announcements. The investor naivete conclusion of Teoh ct al. (J. Financial Econ. 50(1998) 63) and Rangan (J. Financial Econ. 50(1998) 101) appears to be due to test: misspecification. I conclude that seasoned equity issuers' earnings management may not be designed to mislead investors, but may merely reflect the issuers' rational response to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G14; M41.

引用

页码：339 / 371

页数：33

共 44 条

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