Expectation traps and monetary policy

被引:55
作者
Albanesi, S [1 ]
Chari, VV
Christiano, LJ
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[3] Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480 USA
[4] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[5] Fed Reserve Bank Cleveland, Cleveland, OH 44114 USA
[6] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
[7] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.00264
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Why is inflation persistently high in some periods and low in others? The reason may be the absence of commitment in monetary policy. In a standard model, absence of commitment leads to multiple equilibria, or expectation traps, even without trigger strategies. In these traps, expectations of high or low inflation lead the public to take defensive actions, which then make accommodating those expectations the optimal monetary policy. Under commitment, the equilibrium is unique and the inflation rate is low on average. This analysis suggests that institutions which promote commitment can prevent high inflation episodes from recurring.
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页码:715 / 741
页数:27
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