A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects

被引：85

作者：

Breton, M ^{[1
]}

Zaccour, G

Zahaf, M

机构：

[1] HEC Montreal, GERAD, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] HEC Montreal, CREF, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[3] Lakehead Univ, Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1, Canada

来源：

AUTOMATICA | 2005年 / 41卷 / 10期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

environment; joint implementation; differential games;

D O I：

10.1016/j.automatica.2005.05.004

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

This paper proposes a two-player, finite-horizon differential game model to analyze joint implementation in environmental projects, one of the flexible mechanisms considered in the Kyoto Protocol. Our results show that allowing for foreign investments could in some cases increase the welfares of both parties involved in the project. Further, imposing an environmental target constraint does not necessarily deteriorate the payoffs of both players. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1737 / 1749

页数：13

共 31 条

[1] Beyond joint implementation - designing flexibility into global climate policy [J].