Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid

被引：72

作者：

Michaelowa, Axel ^{[1
]}

Michaelowa, Katharina ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Zurich, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2011年 / 39卷 / 11期

关键词：

development assistance; climate policy; public choice; project coding; mitigation; adaptation; RECIPIENT NEED; MATTER;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.020

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

020101 [政治经济学]; 020103 [经济史]; 030301 [社会学];

摘要：

To benefit from a wide-spread public support for climate policy, aid agencies strive to show the climate relevance of their development activities. Using project-level aid data and country-level political data for 21 DAC donors from 1995 to 2007, we test whether this may lead to politically motivated misreporting. Through keyword search in individual project descriptions and complementary hand-coding we assess all aid activities for their actual climate change-related content, and thereby construct our most relevant control variables. Econometric results reveal that indeed, project coding is influenced systematically by the donor governments' ideological orientation as well as by national voters' environmental preferences. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：2010 / 2020

页数：11

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