Performance measurement manipulation: cherry-picking what to correct

被引：14

作者：

Arya, Anil ^{[1
]}

Glover, Jonathan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES | 2008年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

performance measurement; manipulation; incentives;

D O I：

10.1007/s11142-007-9042-3

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

A common feature of managerial and financial reporting is an iterative process wherein various parties selectively correct particular measurements by challenging them and subjecting them to increased scrutiny. We model this feature by adding an agent appeal stage to the standard moral hazard model and show that it can be optimal to allow the agent to decide which performance measures to appeal, despite the agent's incentive to cherry-pick. In the presence of measurement errors, the agent is incentivized by increased opportunities for cherry-picking that arise if he chooses the "right" vs. the "wrong" acts.

引用

页码：119 / 139

页数：21

共 19 条

[1] Formal and real authority in organizations [J].