Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality

被引:18
作者
Christensen, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1215/00318108-109-3-349
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:349 / 371
页数:23
相关论文
共 15 条
[1]   P AND I WILL BELIEVE THAT NOT-P - DIACHRONIC CONSTRAINTS ON RATIONAL BELIEF [J].
BOVENS, L .
MIND, 1995, 104 (416) :737-760
[2]   CLEVER BOOKIES AND COHERENT BELIEFS [J].
CHRISTENSEN, D .
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 1991, 100 (02) :229-247
[3]   CONSERVATISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY + A CRITICAL-EXAMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSOLATIONS OF DOGMATISM [J].
CHRISTENSEN, D .
NOUS, 1994, 28 (01) :69-89
[4]   CHANGE IN VIEW - PRINCIPLES OF REASONING - HARMAN,G [J].
FELDMAN, R .
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 1989, 98 (04) :552-556
[5]  
FOLEY PR, 1994, PHILOS PHENOMENOLOGI, V54, P747
[6]   EPISTEMIC CONSERVATISM [J].
FOLEY, R .
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 1983, 43 (02) :165-182
[7]  
Harman G., 1986, CHANGE VIEW
[8]  
LEVI I, 1970, INDUCTION ACCEPTANCE
[9]  
LYCAN W, JUDGMENT JUSTIFICATI
[10]  
Maher P., 1993, BETTING ON THEORIES