Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations -: art. no. 057901

被引：565

作者：

Scarani, V

Acín, A

Ribordy, G

Gisin, N

机构：

[1] Univ Geneva, Appl Phys Grp, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland

[2] Id Quant, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland

来源：

PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS | 2004年 / 92卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901

中图分类号：

O4 [物理学];

学科分类号：

0702 [物理学];

摘要：

We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.

引用

页数：4

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