Real effort versus chosen effort in experiments

被引:60
作者
Bruggen, Alexander
Strobel, Martin
机构
[1] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Accounting & Informat Management, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
关键词
real effort; chosen effort; experiment;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2007.01.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze two different ways of operationalizing effort in laboratory experiments: real effort where participants work on a specific task, and chosen effort where participants choose increasingly costly effort levels. Our results support equivalence between chosen effort and real effort. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:232 / 236
页数:5
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